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Abstract. A system of dynamic predicate logic is presented. It allows nonstandard modelling of 
time, which makes recursive axiomatization possible, and is essentially one-sorted (the same 
elements code data and time), which makes the system reasonably simple and transparent. The 
system issubjected to usual mathematical onsiderations; in particular, it is shown to be equivalent 
to the three-sorted system due to Andr~ka, Ntmeti and Sain (1982). A conservation result for the 
latter system is obtained as a by-product. 
1.  In t roduct ion  
Systems of dynamic logic deal with syntactic objects of two kinds: formulas and 
programs. It is also common that Kripke semantics i used: the meaning of a program 
is a relation on possible states (of the idealized machine). Various systems differ 
by various design choices concerning the following questions: 
- Are the programs deterministic or indeterministic? 
- Is nonstandard modelling of time (or of iteration) allowed? (The standard model 
of time being just the series of all natural numbers). 
- What is the relation of time elements and data elements ? 
- What are states? 
and various other ones. Several choices have been made: The Polish school works 
with systems that are deterministic; time (iteration) has only the standard meaning 
but it is not internally represented in the system (one cannot speak about the time). 
A pioneering paper is the one by Satwicki [16] (for a survey, see [2]). The American 
school works mainly with systems that are indeterministic and model time in the 
standard way. Another pioneering paper is the one by Pratt [13] (for a survey, see 
[7]); here, the structure of natural numbers is a definable substructure of any model 
of data. 1 The Hungarian school (see [1]) works with deterministic programs and 
possibly nonstandard models of time; their systems are three-sorted: any model 
consists of three disjoint parts data elements, time elements, and intensions (time 
series of data). 
Note that nonstandard models for dynamic propositional logic are investigated in [11, 14]. 
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Our choice will be as follows: we shall prefer finitary systems (recursively axiomat- 
ized, with finitary deduction rules) as better corresponding to theories used by 
human beings or machines proving statements about programsmthis leads to poss- 
ibly nonstandard models of time. This is our first basic design choice. The second 
basic choice is that of essential one-sortedness: we identify time elements and data 
elements; thus, static models of data and time can be imagined as (possibly nonstan- 
dard) models of arithmetic bearing an additional structure (on the same domain)--  
the structure of possible data elements. This choice is specific for our system and 
may be advocated as follows: 
(1) Conceptually, in a machine, data and time elements are represented rather 
than present, and are represented by the same objects (bit strings). 
(2) Technically, our choice makes the formal system reasonably simple; in par- 
ticular, no extra objects coding time sequences of data elements are necessary 
because arithmetic yields a usual definable coding of finite sequences of numbers 
by numbers. 
(3) Metamathematically, the resulting system is satisfactorily general; given a 
theory TD of data and a theory TT of time (satisfying some reasonable conditions) 
we can easily join them to an (essentially) one-sorted theory TD0)TT extending 
both TD and TT conservatively (i.e., a formula A of TD is provable in TD~TT ill 
it is provable in TD and similarly for TT). TD and TT formalize our static knowledge 
on the structure of data and time respectively; thus, TT should imply that time is 
discretely ordered, has a first element and has no last element etc.; TD can, for 
example, axiomatically describe real numbers. 
(4) Again metamathematically, ourdynamic logic is proved to be equivalent (in 
a sense to be made precise) to a system of Andr6ka, N6meti and Sain (ANS in the 
sequel), called 'reasonable dynamic logic' by them. Thus, the former system can 
serve for the same (mathematical s well as metamathematical) purposes as the 
latter, but the former seems to be much simpler. 
Our third design choice is inessential: we work with nondeterministic programs 
and adopt the syntax of regular dynamic logic of Harel because of its simplicity. 
But this could easily be changed. 
Syntax and semantics of our system are elaborated in Sections 2-3 including 
soundness and completeness theorems. Section 4 elaborates point (3) and Section 
5 elaborates point (4); there, we obtain an important conservation result for the 
logic of ANS as a by-product. (Let us mention that this conservation result was 
used to get further results on other systems of ANS in [6].) 
2. Arithmetical theories, programs and dynamic formulas 
Definition 2.1. An arithmetical theory is a (one-sorted) first-order theory T satisfying 
the following: 
(1) The language of T contains the language of Peano arithmetic PA and all 
axioms of PA are provable in T. 
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(2) For each formula A(x , . . . )  of T (possibly containing symbols not being in 
the language of PA), the induction axiom 
(V . . . ) [ (A(O, . . . )  & (Vx)(A(x,.  ..)--> A(x + 1,...))--> (Vx)A(x, . . . ) ]  
is provable in T. 
An arithmetical model ~ is a model of a language L containing the language of 
PA such that ~ ~ PA and ~ satisfies all induction axioms. Arithmetical theories 
will be our static theories of data and time. 
The reader may consult Appendix A for some facts on the Peano arithmetic PA; 
here, we only recall that in PA we can define an operation (Xo, . . . ,  x~) and a 
predicate seq(x) (x is a code of a finite sequence). For each Xo, . . . ,  x~, (x0...  x,) 
is a code of a sequence and its length is n + 1; if z codes a sequence of length Yo, 
then, for each y <Y0, (Z)y is the yth member of z. lh(z) denotes the length of the 
sequence z; if y I> lh(z), then (z)y is defined to be 0. 
We show how to define programs and to combine programs with formulas. 
Definition 2.2. Let L be a predicate language. An assignment (i.e., an expression 
x ~- t where x is a variable and t is a term) is a program. If a and/3 are programs, 
then the following are programs: 
a ; fl (a and then/3----concatenation), 
a u/3 (a or 13--nondeterministic union), 
a* (a iterated--iteration). 
If A is a quantifier-free first-order formula in the language L, then A? is a program 
(test). 
Definition 2.3. Let L be as above. We define dynamic formulas as follows: 
(a) Each first-order formula (of L) is a dynamic formula (of L). 
(b) If A is a dynamic formula and a is a program, then [a]A is a formula. 
(c) Dynamic formulas are closed under quantification and logical connectives. 
For example, ('¢x, y)(P(x, y) --> [(x ~ F(x, y))*]Q(x, y)) is a dynamic formula. 
Note that (a )A  abbreviates --n[a] --n A (a-possibly A). 
Now we specify what our states are. Let an arithmetical model ~ be given. Our 
aim is to define states as some objects of ~2. The most natural idea is to take all 
elements of ~0~ that are finite sequences in the sense of ~!9~; thus we put ST(~[I~)= 
{s ~ MI~ ~ seq(s)}. Then, for each d ~ M, (s)d is defined in ~ and is an object of 
~;  in particular, for each standard n, (s)~ is defined. 
Caution: Trivially, it may happen that s, t are different elements of ST(~0~) but 
(s), = (t)n for each standard n. Nevertheless,  t are different states. 
The evaluation given by a state s is the sequence vs = {(s)n In ~ N}. We shall say 
that a state s satisfies a program-free A in ~ if the corresponding evaluation vs 
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satisfies A in f i  in the usual Tarskian sense. It is easy to see that the relation 
f i  ~ A[s] (for s e ST(f i ) )  satisfies the Tarskian inductive clauses with respect o 
states, i.e., f i  ~ (A & B)[s] iff f i  ~ A[s] and f i  ~ B[s], similarly for other con- 
nectives, f i  ~ (Vx~)A[s] iff for each state t ~ ST(fi)  such that (s)d = (t)a for each 
d e M different from i we have f i  ~ A[ t]. 
Definit ion 2.4. With each program a and each ~R we associate its transition relation 
p~ (or simply p~) on states. We shall see that each relation p~ is definable in fiR. 
(1) If a is xi ~ ~'(x~,..., Xk), then p~(s, t) iff, in f i ,  (t)i = 7((s) j , . . . ,  (S)k) and 
for each d ~ M different from i, (s)a = (t)a. (Thus, p~ is definable.) 
(2) If a is/3 u 3/then p~ = P0 u pv; if a =/3 ; 7, then p~ is the composition of p~, 
pv, i.e., p,(s, t) if[ (in f i )  there is a w~ST( f i )  such that p~(s, w) and' pv(w, t). 
(Thus, if p,,  pv are definable, then so are P0~v and P0;~-) 
(3) If a is A?, A program-free, then p~(s, t) iff f i  ~ (A & s = t) (definable). 
(4) If a is/3", then p~(s, t) iff (in f i )  there is a sequence q of length d+l  such 
that (q)o = s, (q)a = t and, for each d'< d, P~((q)a,, (q)a,+l). This is meaningful in 
f i :  if C~ defines p~ in ~[R (i.e., p~(s, t) if[ f i  ~ C~(s, t)), then p~(s, t) iff 
~R ~ (3z)(3u)(seq(z) & lh(z) = u + 1 & (Z)o = s & (z)a 
= t & (Vv < u)(Co((z)v , (z)~+l))). 
Thus we have a formula C~.(x, y) such that po.(s, t) iff f i  ~ C~.(s, t). And Co. 
defines the reflexive transitive closure of C o in the sense of f i .  Thus, we just took the 
most natural definition of the meaning of iteration and applied it inside f i .  
Lemma 2.5. For each program o~ there is a formula C~(x, y) such that, for each f i ,  
C,(x, y) defines p~ in f i .  
The proof obviously follows from the above. Note that we may and shall assume 
f i  ~ C,~(x, y) --> seq(x) & seq(y). 
Lemma 2.6. I f  p,(s, t), if x j , . . . ,  Xk are all variables of a and u, v ~ ST(f i)  are such 
that (u)i = (s)i and (v)i = (t)i for i being j , . . . ,  k and (u)i = (v)i otherwise, then 
The proof follows by induction on a. 
Definition 2.7. We now define the satisfaction relation f i  ~ A[s] for each dynamic 
formula A, arithmetic model f i  and each s ~ ST(fi). Note that we have already 
defined this for program-free A (see the paragraph above Definition 2.4); the general 
definition consists of Tarskian inductive clauses as formulated in that paragraph 
(but applied to all dynamic formulas) extended by the following clause: 
f i  ~ [a]A[s] if for each t such that p~(s, t) we have f i  ~ A[t]. 
Remark. We shall also freely use the following notation: if B(x~, . . . ,  xj) is a formula 
with free variables x i , . . . ,  xj and a i , . . . ,  aj ~ M, then we write f i  ~ B(a , . . . ,  aj) 
meaning that, for any s such that (s)~ = a , . . . ,  (s)j = aj, we have f i  ~ B[s]. 
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Theorem 2.8. (on expressivity). Each dynamic formula is equivalent to a program-free 
formula; there is a primitive recursive function f associating with each dynamic formula 
A a program-free formula f (A)  such that 
~ A[s] iff ~f (A) [s ]  
for each arithmetical ~ and each s ~ ST(~ff~). 
Proof. The proof follows by induction on A; the only interesting step is that of A 
being [a]B, where a contains variables x j , . . . ,  Xk. By the induction hypothesis, we 
may assume B to be program-free. But by Definition 2.7 and Lemma 2.6, 
~ [a]B[s]  iff (VteST(~J~)(p~(s, t)-->~I~ B[t]) 
(Vy, = xj & . . .  & (y)k 
= xk & Ca(y, B (x j / ( z ) j , . . . ,  
Here, xJ(z) j  means substitution of (z)j for free occurrences of xj. [] 
3. Logical axioms, deduction rules, soundness and completeness 
We shall now formulate logical axioms and deduction rules for dynamic logic. 
They result from axioms and deduction rules of classical first-order logic by adding 
Harel's axioms and rules expressing properties of programs. In this framework we 
shall study arithmetical theories as defined above; thus, using only program-free 
special axioms but logical axioms and rules concerning dynamic formulas we shall 
study provability of arbitrary dynamic formulas. It is immaterial which formalization 
of classical first-order logic we use; we just take one of them. In the sequel, A, B 
vary over formulas, x is a variable, • is a term. Saying "~" is free for x in A" we 
mean the following: x has no free occurrence in the scope of any quantifier binding 
a variable occurring in ~'. Also recall that (a)A abbreviates ~[a]  --1 A. 
Logical axioms: 
(T) all propositional tautologies, 
(F01) (:Ix)A= A, A program-free, x not free in A, 
(F02) A(T)-->(3x)A(x), A program-free, z free for x in A, 
(F03) equality axioms for the language L, 
(~-R) [x~z]A(x ) - -A (z ) ,  A program-free, T free for x in A, 
(?R) [B?]A = B ~ A, 
(;R) [a 
(uR)  [auB]A~[a]A&[B]A .  
Inference rules: 
A ,A~B 
(MP) modus ponens B 
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Generalizations: 
(G1) 
A~B 
(3x)A-~ (3x)B '  
(G2) 
A~B 
[a]A~[ot]B" 
Invariance : 
(I) 
A~[a]A  
A~ [a*]A 
for A program-free. 
Convergence: 
(c) 
A(x+l )~(a)A(x )  
(3 x) A(x) -~ ( a *)A(0)" 
In (C), A is program-free, x is free in A and does not occur in a. This system of 
axioms and rules is called P. 
Remark 3.1. Here we correct wo minor errors in [7]. First, in [7], the condition is 
missing saying that, in (*-R), z must be free for x in A. Second, Harel only assumes 
for (C) that x does not occur in a as the left-hand side of any assignment (x ~ var(c~)). 
It is easy to see that this is not sound: take 
y=x+l  ~ (y~x)y=x.  
This is a tautology (both in Harel's sense and in ours) and x occurs in y ~ x but 
not as desired, i.e., x~var (a ) .  Evidently, 
y=x ~ ( (y~x)*)y=O 
is not a tautology. 
In the sequel, we closely follow Harel's proof of soundness and completeness; 
we have to be careful for two reasons--first, because our semantics i nonstandard, 
and, second, because of the above mistake in [7]. 
Theorem 3.2. The above system P is arithmetically sound, i.e., if T is an arithmetical 
theory and if a dynamic formula is provable in (P + T), then it is satisfied by each 
state of each model of T. (In symbols, (P + T) ~- A implies I=TA). 
ProoL The proof follows by induction on proofs in (P + T). The only nontrivial 
steps are those concerning iteration. 
(a) I f~  ~ (A-> [a]A)[s] for each s e ST(H), then ~ ~ (A--> [a*]A)[s] for each 
s ~ ST(~[R). Indeed, assume ~ ~ A[s] and p~.(s, t). Our aim is to prove ~0~  Air]. 
Let q e M be the sequence witnessing p,~.(s, t), i.e., satisfying the following in ~0~: 
d + 1 = lh(q), (q)o = s, (q)d = t and, for all d'< d, C,~((q)d,, (q)d'+,). Ol'serve that 
('o's ~ ST(~R))~[R ~ (A--> [a]A)[s] 
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is equivalent to 
~3~  (Vs, t)(C~(s, t) & A((s)~, . . . ,  (S)k)--> A( ( t ) j , . . . ,  (t)k)) 
where x j , . . . ,  Xk are free variables of A. 
By induction inside ~I~, we get 
~ ((Vd' < d)(Vz = (q)d,)(A((z) j , . . .  (Z)k))), 
thus ~ ~ A(( t ) j , . . .  (t)k), or, equivalently, ~9~  A[t]. 
(b) If ~ ~ (A(xi + 1) --> (a)A(x,))[s] for all s, then ~ ~ (A(x~) -> (a*)A(O))[s] for 
all s. Indeed, let ~ ~ A(xi)[s] and let d = (s)i (the value of x~ given by s). Again, 
we may assume A to be program-free. Let us show that for each d' < d there is a t 
such that p~.(s, t), ( t )~=d' ,  and ~ A(xi)[t]. (Then, taking d '=0 we get our 
result.) But here everything is also expressible in ~,  so we may use induction in 
~9~: Observe that 
('¢s ~ ST(~))~ff~ (A(x, + 1) --> (a)A(x,))[s] 
is equivalent to 
~ (Vs)(seq(s) & A((s), + 1, ( s ) j , . . . ,  (S)k)--> (30(C~,(s, t) 
& A((t)i,  (t)j, . . .  (t)k))). ('~) 
Note that since xi does not occur in a we have (s)i = (t)~. This enables us to prove 
the following by induction applied in ~2 (w.r.t. x): 
~ (Vx)(Vs)(seq(s) & (s), = x & A((s),, (s ) j , . . . ,  (S)k) 
--> (3t)( C~.(s, t) & A(O, ( t)j, . . . , ( t)k))). 
This is true if x = 0 (since C,~.(s, s) holds for all s), and if this is true for some x, 
then so it is for x+l ;  this follows from (~). In fact, assume ( s )~=x+l  and 
A((s)i, (s)~, . . . ,  (s)k) and let s' be such that (s')i = x and (S')d = (S)a otherwise; let 
t' be as in (~-), i.e., C~(s', t') and A((t')i, ( t ' ) j , . . . ,  (t')k). Now change t' to t by 
defining (t)~ = x + 1 and (t)a = (t') a o.w. Since x~ does not occur in a, we have Ca (s, t). 
By induction hypothesis, there is an u' such that C~.(t', u') & A(O, (u')~,. . . ,  (U')k). 
Defining u from u' as t from t' and arguing as above we have C~.(t, u). From 
C,,(s, t) and C,,.(t, u) we evidently get C~,.(s, u); and we have A(0, (u)j, .... , (u)l,). 
This completes the soundness proof for (C). [] 
Lemma 3.3 (Harel [7, Lemma 3.7]). The following are derived rules of P: 
A->B 
(G') 
(ot)A-->(a)B" 
B~ A ,A~[a]A ,A~C 
(I') B ~ [ a*] C , where A is program-free. 
B->(=lx)A(x), A (x+l ) ->(a)A(x) ,  A(O)->C 
(c') 
B"> (a*)C 
where A is program-free and x does not  occur  in a. 
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Proof (see [7]). For (C'): if ~-A(x+ 1)-~ (a)A(x), then ~ (3x)A(x )~ (a*)A(0). 
If ~ A(0) ~ C, then ~ (a*)A(0) -* (a*)C; thus, t-- B ~ (a*)C. [] 
Lemma 3.4 (Harel [7, Lemma 3.10]). For each program ot and arbitrary dynamic 
formulas B and C there is a program-free formula A(x) such that x does not occur in 
B, C, a and such that, for each arithmetical ~3~, if ~ ~- B --> (a*)C, then ~ ~ B --> 
(3x)A(x),  ~IR~ A(x+ l)->(a)A(x) and ~ A(O)-> C. 
ProoL Assume that the variables in B, a, C are x j , . . . ,  Xk; these are different from 
x. A(x) means: there is a sequence z of length x+ 1 such that, for each y<~x, (z)y 
is a sequence (i.e., a state), ((Z)o)j=Xj,...,((Z)O)k=Xk. Further, we have 
C(((Z)x)j , . . . ,((Z)x)k) and, if y<x,  then C~((z),(Z)y+l). [] 
Lemma 3.5 (Harel [7, Lemma 3.11]--diamond completeness). I fa  is a program, B, 
C are program-free and if ~r  (B--> (a)C), then (P+ T) ~- B--> (a)C. 
Proof. The proof follows by induction on a. If a is atomic or a test, then axioms 
(~-R) and (?R) reduce B--> (a )C  to a program-free formula (possibly after renaming 
bound variables in C), which is true in all models of T and therefore provable in 
T. If a is/3 u y, then the proof is easy. If a is/3 ; y, then we have B--> (/~)(y)C and 
use the dual form of (; R). Let A be a program-free formula equivalent to (y)C; 
then we have ~TB->(/3)A, thus ~ B-->(/3)A; furthermore, ~ A-> (y)C, thus ~ A--> 
(y)C and hence ~-(/3)A--> (/3)(y)C. We get ~- B-> (/3)(y)C as desired. 
If a is/3", then take the formula A yielded by Lemma 3.4; we have 
~B-->(3x)A(x),  ~A(x+l ) -~(a)A(x )  and ~A(0) ->C;  
thus, these three formulas are provable by induction hypothesis, and rule (C') gives 
~- B-> (a*)C. [] 
Lemma 3.6 (Harel [7, Lemma 3.9], box-completeness). For each program a and each 
program-free B, C, if ~ r B --> [ t~ ]C, then ~- B -> [ a ] C. 
The proof of this lemma is easy and analogous to that of Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5. 
Completeness Theorem 3.7 (Harel [7, Theorem 3.12]). I f  T is an arithmetical theory 
and if a dynamic formula is satisfied by each state of each model of T, then it is 
provable in (P+ T); in symbols: ~rA  implies (P+ T) ~- A. 
Proof (Harel [7, proof of Theorem 3.1]). By propositional calculus, assume that 
A is in conjunctive normal form; let the complexity of A be the number n of 
occurrences of modalities (of the form Its], (a)) and of quantifiers prefixed to 
formulas containing modalities (nontrivial quantifiers). The proof will proceed by 
induction on n. If n = 0, then A is program-free and the result follows by completeness 
of the classical predicate calculus, 
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Otherwise, assume the result for n - 1. If A has the form A1 & A2, then we have 
~rA1 and ~TA2 and have to prove (P+ T) ~- A1 and (P+ T) t-- A2. Thus, assume 
that A is a single disjunction. We can assume that A has one of the forms A1 v [a]A2, 
A1 v (a)A2, A1 v (Vx)A2,  or A1 v (3x)A2,  where A1 may be empty but the second 
disjunct is not program-free. Thus, we are guaranteed that A1, A2 have complexity 
<n. By Theorem 2.8, let AIO, A20 be program-free and such that ~rA10- -A1 ,  
~rA20-A2 .  Let (*) stand for [a], (a), (Vx), (=:ix), respectively. We have 
~T-~A10-> (*)A20 and (P+ T) I---~A10~ (*)A20 
(using box or diamond completeness if (*) is a modality and classical completeness 
otherwise). Furthermore, we have 
(P + T) ~- A IO~ A1 and (P + T) ~- A20--> A2 
by induction hypothesis, since the complexity of A10-> A1 is <n and similarly for 
A20--> A2. By (G2) or quantifier generalization, we obtain (P + T) ~- (*)A20--> (*)A2 
and, by propositional calculus, (P + T) f- -aA1 -> (*)A2 or (P + T) t- A1 v (*)A2. [] 
4. Kneaded sums of theories of data and time 
In this and the next section, we are going to clarify the question whether our 
decision for substantial one-sortedness (i.e., the decision to code data and time 
elements by the same objects) is in any sense restrictive. In this section we define 
a special sum theory of data and time, yielding arithmetical theories as results, and 
show that, under very natural conditions, the kneaded sum of a theory of data with 
a theory of time extends both the theory of data and the theory of time conservatively. 
Definition 4.1. Let TD be a first-order theory with language (= set of predicates, 
functions, symbols, and constants) Ld and let TT be a first-order theory in the 
language Lt of Peano arithmetic PA; assume that TT contains PA and that TD has 
only infinite models. Assume that Lt and Ld are disjoint, but that formulas of Lt 
and Ld use the same object variables. The kneaded sum TDt~TT of TD and TT 
has the language Ltu Ld and the following axioms: 
(1) axioms of TT, 
(2) axioms of TD, and 
(3) full induction schema, i.e., for each (Ltw Ld)-formula A(x, . . . ) ,  the axiom 
(A(O,.. .) & (Vx)(A(x,...)--> A(x  + 1,...)))--> (Vx)A(x,  . . .). 
Remarks 4.2. (1) Thus TT~ TD is an arithmetical first-order theory in the sense of 
Definition 2.1. 
(2) Recall that a theory T containing a theory To is a conservative extension of 
To if each To-formula provable in T is provable in To. 
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Theorem 4.3. Under the assumptions of Definition 4.1, put T= TD0)TT. 
(1) T is a conservative extension of TD. 
(2) Let Conxo be the formal consistency statement for TD formulated in TT. I f  
TT  proves COnTD and if TT  proves that TD has no finite models, then T is a conservative 
extension of TT. 
Proof. (1) It is sufficient o prove that each countable model ~Rd of TD can be 
expanded to a model of T. But this is evident since we may assume that the domain 
of ~ is the set of natural numbers and we may add the standard arithmetical 
structure to ~d.  By standardness, the resulting model ~ satisfies full induction. 
(2) Here we use the arithmetized Completeness Theorem 3.7 (for details, see, 
e.g., [18]): If ~t ~ TT & ConTo, then inside ~Rt one can define a model ~d of TD. 
The domain of ~Ro is a definable subset of the domain of ~Rt and the relations etc. 
of ~a  are definable. This is achieved by formalizing in ~RT the usual proof of 
Completeness Theorem 3.7 by extending To to a complete consistent theory with 
enough witnessing constants. Since ~t  proves that the domain Ms of ~/~d is infinite 
(in the sense of ~R~) there is a definable bijection of Mo to Mt; thus, we may assume 
Mt = Md. Since ~[Rd is defined inside ~Rt, it is clear that the resulting model (~t, Md) 
satisfies full induction. [] 
Remark 4.4. Note that there are TD and TT such that TD~TT extends TT noncon- 
servatively: let TT be PA and let TD be (PA'+ fg) where PA' is another copy of PA 
with the same variables but distinct copies of nonlogical symbols and fg is Gfdel's 
true unprovable ,Yl-formula formulated in the language of PA'. I f  ~ ~ TD~TT 
and ~d,  ~Rt are reducts of ~R to the language of TD, TT respectively, then full 
induction in ~ guarantees the existence of an isomorphical embedding of ~Rt onto 
an initial segment of ~;  thus, the validity of ~ in ~R (thus, in ~D~d) implies the 
validity of the corresponding TT-copy ~' of ~ in ~ (in Mr). But ~0' is improvable 
in TT. 
The proof of Theorem 4.3 was suggested by one of the referees; the author's 
original proof consisted in showing that if TT is PA and TD is GB (G6del-Bernays 
set theory), then TD~TT proves ConGB (formulated in TT) whereas, of course, 
TT ~ Con6B. 
5. Equivalence to a many-sorted formalization 
The reader may still be worried by some questions. Our TD~TT extends both 
summands conservatively w.r.t, program-free formulas (under reasonable condi- 
tions); but if we defined a theory of data and time from TD and TT in another way, 
would we obtain different valid dynamic formulas ? In particular, what would be a 
many-sorted formalization, keeping data and time elements disjoint? In this section 
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~e shall describe the formalization due to Andr6ka, N6meti and Sain (ANS) and 
how that it has the same valid pure dynamic formulas as defined below. In fact, 
he system we define below differs from that of ANS in that ANS uses program 
chemes, not regular programs; but this is an inessential difference and we could 
hange the notation of programs throughout this paper to program schemes of ANS 
¢ithout causing any difficulties; all proofs would modify trivially. 
)efinition 5.1. A dynamic formula of TD0)TT is pure if it does not contain any 
ymbols of the language of TT; i.e., atomic subformulas and assignments contained 
1 it are built from the symbols of the language of TD. 
(Thus, these are formulas speaking just about data and programs, not explicitly 
peaking about time.) 
)efinition 5.2. We describe formulas, programs, and models of a variant of reason- 
~ble dynamic logic of ANS. Let TD and TT be as in Section 4 but now assume that 
"T and TD have disjoint sets of variables. The ANS-sum TD 0)3 TT of TD and TT 
the following first-order theory: 
(a) Language. The language of TD 0)3 TT has three sorts of variables: d-variables 
:, Xo, x l , . . .  (for data), t-variables z, Zo, Z l , . . .  (for time), and i-variables y, Y0,... 
for intensions--infinite time series of data elements). The language consists of the 
mguages in TD, of TT, and of a binary function symbol ext: ext(o., ~r) is meaningful 
from the fact that o. is a term of sort i and ~" is a term of sort t it follows that 
xt(o-, ~') is of sort d. We write o-(7) instead of ext(o., r). 
(b) Bounded formulas. An intension y is bounded (or almost constant) if there is 
time element z such that for each z '>  z we have y(z )=y(z ' ) .  In symbols: 
~d(y) -- ( : lz)(Vz'> z)(y(z) = y(z')). A formula of TD 0)3 TT is i-bounded if each 
uantifier binding an i-variable is bounded, i.e., occurs in the context (Vy)(Bd(y) -> 
• -) or (3y)(Bd(y) &. - -). Note that, in fact, i-bounded formulas speak on initial 
egments of all time series. 
(c) Axioms. The axioms of TD 0)3 TT are as follows: 
(1) for datawaxioms of TD, 
(2) for t imewaxioms of TT (note that TT contains PA), 
(3) induction for all i-bounded formulas: if A(z , . . . )  is i-bounded, then 
(A(0, . . . )  & (Vz)(A(z , . . . ) -> A(z  + 1,...)))--> (Vz )A(z , . . . )  
is an axiom, 
(4) existence of intensions: if A(z, x , . . . )  is i-bounded, then 
(Vz) (3x)A(z ,  x, . . .) -> (3y) (Vz)A(y(z ) ,  z, . . .) 
is an axiom, 
(5) extensionality for intensions: 
(Vyly2)[(Vz)(yl(z) = y2(z))-> yl = Y2], 
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(6) infinity of the data universe: 
(Vy)(Bd(y) --> (:lx)(Vz)(x # y(z))) 
(data elements cannot be enumerated by a bounded intension). 
(d) Models. A model of TD 093 TT is a three-sorted structure ~IR = (~O2d, ~92t, Hi), 
where the domains of ~[gd, ~[l~t, ~ i  are disjoint, ~d ~ TD, 2Rt ~ TT, ~[Ri = (Mi, e), 
e : Mix Mt-> Md is a mapping such that all the axioms above are satisfied. 
(e) Remark. In the definitions of reasonable DL in [10] there is no restriction on 
quantification of intensions; thus, here we should speak on weak reasonable DL. 
Without going into details let us say that weak reasonable DL is related to reasonable 
DL as first-order Peano arithmetic to second-order (axiomatic) arithmetic with full 
comprehension. 
(f) Programs are given as in Definition 2.2; in assignments and tests, only terms 
and formulas of TD are allowed. Let ~ ~ TD 0)3 TT, let a be a program and let 
all variables of a be among Xo,.. ,, x,. Any n-tuple (do , . . . ,  dn)~ M~ is an input 
for a. We define possible outputs for (do , . . . ,  dn) (w.r.t. a) as follows. 
Let us write S~(do,..., dn, eo , . . . ,  en) for " (Co, . . . ,  e,) is a possible output of a 
with the input (do , . . . ,  dn)"; write d for (do , . . . ,  d,) and similarly for e. 
If a is xi ~ ~'(xj, . . . ,  Xk), then S~,(d, e) iff ei = t~(d j , . . . ,  dk) and ep =dp for p # i. 
S~v(d ,  e) iff S~(d, e) or S~(d, e), 
S~,~(d, e) iif there is an f such that S~(d,f) and S~(f, e), 
S~?(d, e) if[ e= d and~ ~ A(e j , . . . ,  ek), 
S~.(d, e) iff there are bounded intensions io , . . - , /~ and a t e Mt such that we have 
d = (i0(0),.. •, in(0)), e = (io(t),..., in(t)) 
and for each t '<  t we have 
S~(io(t'), . .  . ,  in(t'), io(t'+ 1), . . . ,  in(t'+ 1)). 
Thus again, the iteration is made inside the model. Evidently, for each a and each 
n such that all variables of a are among Xo, . . . ,  xn, S~ is definable in ~ by means 
of an i-bounded formula. 
(g) Satisfaction for dynamic formulas. I f  ~ ~ TD ~3 TT, if a is a program, and 
if k, q are mappings of N into Md (evaluations of data variables), then write S~(k, q) 
for (=ln)S~(k I n, q I n), where k ~ n is the n-tuple k (0 ) , . . . ,  k(n) and analogously 
for q. Up to now, all formulas have been program-free. Formulas containing 
programs are defined as usual; we are going to define satisfaction for them. Satisfac- 
tion ~tR~A[g,k,r] is defined for each triple g:N-->Mt, k:N->Md, r:N-->Mi 
(evaluation of variables of all three sorts) in the evident way; note that 
~ [a]B[g, k, r] iff for each q such that S~(k, q) we have ~ ~ B[g, q, r]. 
This completes the definition. For further details, see [1]. 
Observe that we may identify pure dynamic formulas as given in Definition 5.1 
with the formulas defined in the same manner in the ANS formalism: formulas built 
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up from the symbols of TD and from programs. Thus, we shall speak about pure 
dynamic formulas (p.d.f.'s) in both systems. We have the notion of being valid in 
either system: A p.d.f. A is valid iff it is true in each model of the system. Our aim 
is to show that our system has the same valid p.d.f.'s as ANS. In this sense, the 
systems are equivalent. 
Lemma 5.3 (see [1, Section I, Theorem 2]). TD t~ 3 TT is expressive, i.e., there is a 
recursive function 0 associating with each pure dynamic formula A a program-free 
i-bounded formula O(A ) such that 
~]R ~ A[g, k, r] iff ~ ~ O(A)[g, k, r] 
for each ~f~, g, k, r. 
The proof is a routine matter (of. Theorem 2.8 above). 
Theorem 5.4. I f  a p.d.f. A is satisfiable in TD~TT,  then A is satisfiable in TD t~ 3 TT. 
Proof. Let ~[R~ TD~TT.  We shall define a model ~[1~ 3 of TD0)3 TT. Let ~R~, $R2 
be two disjoint copies of 2R, and let gk:2~k~iR (k= 1, 2) be corresponding 
isomorphisms. Let Mo be the set of all f :  M-* M that are parametrically definable 
in ~r~; for each such f, the mapping f * :M2- ,  M~ determined by f is defined by 
f*(z)  = g-~l(f(g2(z))). Let ~d =~]021 t LTD, ~Rt=~0~2 I L-rr be the restrictions to the 
language of TD and TT, respectively; let Mi be the set of all f *  determined by all 
f~Mo and, finally, let exp(f, z )=f (z )  for each fe  Mi and z eMt .  Put ~923= 
(2Rd, ~t ,  (Mi, exp)). For a ~ Md put a '=  gl(a); for b ~ Mt put b' = g2(b). 
Let now A(x,y~,y2, z) be a program-free i-bounded formula (where x, Yl, Y2, z 
are tuples of variables of the respective sorts). Let y~, y~, z' be a tuple of data 
variables (= variables of TDE)TT) of the same length as y~, Y2, z and distinct from 
all variables occurring in A. 
The proof continues with proving a series of lemmas. 
Lemma 5.4.1. Given bl ~ Mi, there are b~ ~ M and a TDO)TT-formula ,4(x, Y'I, Y~, z') 
such that for each a ~ Md, c ~ Mt and each tuple b2 ~ Mi of bounded intensions there 
A 
are b2 ~ M such that 
~3 ~ A(a, bl, b2, c) iff ~1]~ /~(a', /~1, /~2, c'). 
Proof. The proof follows by induction on subformulas of A. The assertion is evident 
for atomic formulas not containing any i-variables. If y is free in A, then, by trivial 
transformations, we may assume that it occurs in A only in contexts of the form 
x = y(~) where z is a term of sort t. Now, i fy belongs to y~, it has a fixed interpretation 
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by a b e Mi; if b is determined by f and f is parametrically defined by B and /~ 
(i.e., u =f (v )  iff ~ ~ B(u, v, b)), then 
~[R3 ~ ext(b, c) = a iff 2)2 ~ B(a', c', b). 
If y belongs to Y2, i.e., is to be interpreted by bounded intensions, then we use a 
uniform coding of bounded infinite intensions by finite sequences assuming that 
the last member of the sequence is repeated ad infinitum, i.e., we define (x)* = (X)y 
if lh(x) < y, (x)* = (X)~h(x)-i f 0 < lh(x) <~ y and (0)* = 0 for each y. Obviously, if b 
is bounded, then there is a/~ ~ M such that 
~3 ~ ext(b, c) = a iff ~R ~ (/~)c, = a'. 
The induction step for logical connectives and quantifications over d- and t- 
variables is evident; thus, assume that A is (3y)(Bd(y) & B(x, yl, Y2, z)), let b~ ~ M~, 
let/~ s M and let B be such that, for each a, c, and i-bounded (b2, b) there are/~,  
/~ ~ M such that 
~f~3 ~ B(a, bm, b2, b, c) iff ~ I~ B(a', fh, f~2, f~, c'). 
Note that our construction is such that given a, c and given a tuple (/~2,/~) of 
elements of M, each satisfying seq (being a finite sequence of M) ,  there is a tuple 
(b2, b) of bounded intensions such that (-~-) holds. Thus, 
~[l~ 3 ~ (3y)(Bd(y)  & B(a, b~, b2, y, c)) iff ~ ~ (~y')(seq(y') & B(a',/~,/~2, Y', c')). 
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.4.1. [] 
Lemma 5.4.2. ~ff~3 is a model of TD ~s  TT. 
Proof. We have to verify induction and existence. 
Let A(z,. . .) be i-bounded and let ~3 ~ A(O, q) & (Vz)(A(z, q) --> A(z+ 1, q)). Let 
and ~ be such that 
A(c, q) iit 
Then, ~0~  (Vz')A(z', t~), thus ~3 ~ (Vz)A(z, q). 
Now assume 2R3 ~ (Vz)(3x)A(x, z, q). Let ,4 be such that ~0~3 ~ A(a, c, q) iff 
~R~,4(a ' , c ' ,~) ;  let, for each c'~M, f (c ' )  be the minimal a' such that 
~R ~ ,4(a', c', ~). Then, f is parametrically definable in ~0~ and determines a b ~ M,; 
this b satisfies ~3 ~ (Vz)A(b(z), z, q). [] 
Now we come back to pure dynamic formulas; recall the set ST(~I~) of all (inner) 
states of ~DL For each s ~ STC~[R), let s ~ : N-> M1 be defined as s#(n) = g-- l((S)n).  
Lemma 5.4.3. For each program-free p.d.f. A and each s ~ ST(H),  ~ ~ A[s] iff 
~ff~3 ~ A[ s'~]. 
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The proof follows by Lemma 5.4.1 and the paragraph before Definition 2.4. 
Lemma 5.4.4. For each program a, p~ (sl, s2) iff So, 3(sl, s~) and (sl)~ = (s2)~ for 
each nonstandard a ~ M. 
Proof. The proof is by induction, the only interesting case being that of iteration. 
Let a = fl* and suppose the lemma to hold for ft. First assume p~(Sl, s2), i.e., in ~R, 
there is a finite sequence q of states of length t+ 1, such that (q)o = s~, (q), = s2 and, 
for all t'< t, p,((q)t',  (q)~'+~). Let variables of 13 be among Xo, . . . ,x~.  Define fj 
( j - -1 , . . . ,  n) to be the mapping of M into M defined as follows: f j ( t )=  a iff 
((q)~)j = a (the j th component of the tth state in q). Observe that fj is definable in 
~R, thus fj e Mo and the mapping f *  determined by fj is in M~. Thus, the intensions 
f * , . . .  , f *  prove S,~(s~, s~). Evidently, (s~)c = (s2)c for all nonstandard c e M. 
Conversely, if S~(s~, s~), (Sa)~ = (s2)~ for all nonstandard c and f * , . . .  , f *  are 
the intensions showing S,~(s~,s~) together with a c~Mt (i.e., for j=0 , . . . ,  n, 
fj(0) = (sl)j,f j(c)= (s2)j and the iteration condition holds), then, in ~IR, these are 
finite sequences qo , . . . ,  q, of length c+ 1 such that (tb)~ =f j (u)  for u ~< c; and there 
is a q of length c+ 1 such that, for all u~ < t', seq((q),.) and 
/~ ((q)u)j=(qj)u & length((q).,)=length(sl) 
j~n 
(vt > n)((q)u),=(s,),. 
This q shows that p~(s,, s2). [] 
Lemma 5.4.5. For each p.d.f. A and each s ~ ST(~R), ~'~ ~ A[s] iff ~ ~ A[s#]. 
Proof. The proof follows by induction on the complexity of ,4, the only interesting 
case is that of A being [a]B. But then the induction step follows by Lemma 5.4.4. 
(Note that if S~(s #, k), then there is a te  ST(~R) such that t #= k and (s)c= (t)c 
for all nonstandard c e M.) [] 
Proof of Theorem 5.4 (continued). Let A be a p.d.f, satisfiable in a model ~ of 
TD~TT,  i.e., for some s ~ ST(H),  ~R ~ A[s]. Then ~[1~3 constructed above is a model 
of TD E)3 TT and ~R3 ~ A[s#]. This completes the proof. [] 
Before proving the converse of Theorem 5.4, we prove a result on TD ~3 TT 
which may be of independent interest. 
Theorem 5.5. The axiom 
(3y)[ (vx) (3 z)(y(z) = x sc (v z2)(zl z2 y(z ) ] 
saying "'there is an intension which is a bijection of time elements onto data elements" 
extends TD 0)3 TT conservatively w.r.t, i-bounded formulas. 
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Proof .  The proof will be divided into ten steps (1)-(10). Let ~ = (~d,  ~[l~t, ~i)  be 
a countable model of TD ~)3 TT; we show that there is a model ~IR = (~Rd, ~t ,  ~i )  
having only more intensions than 2~ (and such that, for each b ~ Mi and c e Mr, 
b(c) is the same in ~/i as in Mi) such that in ~ i  there is an intension G being the 
desired bijection. The proof will use the method of forcing as invented by Cohen 
and then developed by many other people (see [3]). We shall use some techniques 
of [9, 20]. 
(1) Let P be the set of all X-finite sequences of data elements, i.e., of mappings 
f such that for an intension b and a time element c, dora(f )  = {c'e Mtl c '<  c} and, 
for each such c', f (c ' )= b(c'). Evidently, P is countable and is partially ordered 
under inclusion (~_). 
Note that each fe  P is coded by the pair (by, c) such that (Vc '< c)(bi(c' ) =f(c')) 
and (Vc'~ > c)(bs(c')=f(c)). Saying that a subset of P is definable in ~ we mean 
that the corresponding set of codes is definable in SR as a subset of Mix  Mt. 
(2) A set E ~ P is dense if each fe  P is comparable with an e e E, i.e., f _  e or 
ec_f A set F_c P is a generic path in P if (i) F is linearly ordered by _c, (ii) for 
each f g ~ P, f~  g e F implies f~  F, and (iii) F intersects each parametrically 
i-boundedly definable dense set E ~_ P. 
In the sequel, write p.i.b.d, for 'parametrically i-boundedly definable'. 
(3) Claim: There is a generic F_  P. Indeed, there are countably many p.i.b.d. 
dense sets; arrange them into a sequence Eo, El,  . . . .  Take an eoC Eo; given e, _ eo, 
first find e e E,+I comparable with e, and then let e,+l be the longer of e, e, (thus, 
e,+~ = e u e,). Put f~  F iff (3n) ( f~ e,); evidently, F is generic. In the sequel, F 
means a fixed generic path in P. 
(4) Now put G = [._JF (thus, e, ___ G for each n); then G is a mapping into Md. 
We show dom(G) = Mr: if b e Mr, put E = { fe  PI b ~ dora(f)}. E is parametrically 
definable and dense; thus, for an fe  E we havef~ G and consequently b e dora(G). 
Further, we show that G maps Mt onto Md: if a eMd,  then put E= 
{ fe  PI a ~ range(f)) .  E is p.i.b.d, and dense, thus for some fe  E we have f___ G 
and consequently a e range(G).  (Note that G is not one-one.) 
(5) We let ~/i be the set of all mappings h'Mt--> Md satisfying the following: 
There is a relation K _ P x P p.i.b.d, in ~IR and such that h = [_J K"F. We put 
where ~ i  = (~?/i, ext^), ~/t is as defined above, and ext^(c, b )= c(b). Elements of ~/~ 
are new intensions; in the obvious sense, Mi__. ~ti, i.e., each old intension is a new 
intension: if c e Mi, then define (f, g) e K iff f~  c and length(f)  = length(g). Then 
c = I._} K"F. Also G is a new intension: take the identity fo r /C  We shall show that 
JQi has all properties we need. 
(6) Claim: If b e ~/i is bounded, then b e Mi (all bounded intensions are old). 
I f  b e ]Qi, b = (_J K"F and, for all c'>~ c, b(c) = b(c'), then there are fe  P and g e F 
such that length(f)>~c, f cb ,  and ( f ,g )eK ;  let (by, c) be the code o f f ;  then 
b=by~ Mi. 
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Thus, quantification over bounded intensions of /~r can be replaced by quan- 
tification over elements of P. 
(7) Lemma: A relation X ~_ M~ x Mt  x pk is p.i.b.d, in ~ iff there is a relation R 
p.i.b.d, in ~IR and such that X = R"F (where F is the generic subset of P from (3)). 
The proof is by induction on the definition of X. If X___ Md is defined by an 
atomic formula of Ld, then take R = X x P; similarly, for X ~ Mt defined by an 
atomic formula and for X ={Ca, b, c)la ~ Md, c s Mt, b bounded intension, a = 
b(c)}. If X={(a ,c ) la~Ma,  ceMt ,  a=b(c)} for a new intension b, then, by 
definition, we have b = U K"F  for a K p.i.b, definable in ~2 and X = R"F where 
(Ca, c), f )~  R iff (::lg e p)( (g , f )~ K & a = g(c)) and K is p.i.b, definable in ~IR. This 
covers atomic cases. 
If X = R'~'F and Y= R~F, then Xu  Y= R~'Fu R~F. Let X = R"F and let Y be 
the complement of X in the appropriate cartesian product M <). Then Y = R"F, 
where 
/~ = {ix, f)] x ~ M <) & (Vg)((x, g) ~ R -->f and g are incomparable)}. 
Indeed, assume x ~/~"F, thus ix, f )~/~ and f~ F. Then, (x, g)~ R implies that f, g 
are incomparable, thus g~ F; hence x~ R"F. Conversely, assume x~/~"F. Then 
('¢f~ F ) (3g  comparable with f)((x, g) ~ R). Put 
E = {f~ P l(x, f )  ~ R} u {f~ P] (Vg ~ P)((x, g) ~ R -->f, g incomparable)}. 
Then E is dense and p.i.b, definable in ~7~, thus there is an f~ E c~ F. Necessarily, 
f is in the first summand of the definition of E, thus (x , f )~R and fe  F. Thus, 
x ~ R"F = X. 
It remains to handle quantification. First assume that X ~ M~ +1 x Mt  x pk, X = 
R"F, and Y = {ql (3x ~ Ma)((x, q) ~ X)}. Then put (q, f )  e R 1 iff (=lx)((x, q, f )  ~ R); 
if R is p.i.b.d, in ~,  then so is R1 and Y= R~F; similarly for quantification over 
time elements and bounded intensions. This completes the proof of Lemma (7). 
(8) Lemma. I f  A(x, z, q) is i-bounded and ~ (Vz)(3!x)A(x, z, q) for some q, 
then there is a b ~ 1('Ii such that ~ ~ (Vz)A(b(z), z, q). 
Proof. Put X = {f~ P l(Vc < length(f))(~ A(f(c),  c, q))}. Then X is p.i.b.d, in 
~2 and there is a K p.i.b.d, in ~[R such that X = K"F. We may assume K ___ P × P; 
then b = [._] K"F is a new intension according to (5). 
(9) Lemma. I f  B(z, q) is i-bounded and ~ ~ (3z)B(z, q) for some q, then there is 
a Co~ Mt such that ~ B(co, q) & (Vz'< Co) 7 B(z', q). 
Proof. Let ~9~  B(c~, q) and let al # a2 be some elements of Md. Define 
A(x, z, q, cl) - (B(z, q) & z<~ cl & x = al) v ((TB(z, q) v z> cl) & x = a2). 
By I_emma (8), A defines an intension b such that ~ ~ (Vz)A(b(z), z, q, Cl). But, 
evidently, b is bounded and therefore an element of Mi. In ~R, we have b(cl) = al 
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and therefore, in ~R, there is a Co such that b(co)= a~ & (Vz < Co)(b(z)= a2). The 
same is true in ~2; thus, in ~2, Co is the desired minimum. 
(10) Conclusion. In Lemma (9) we proved that the least number principle for 
p.i.b.d, subsets of Mt holds in ~:r~; evidently, this implies induction for i-bounded 
formulas, i.e., axiom (3) from Definition 5.2(c) is satisfied in ~.  It remains to show 
that axiom (4), i.e., existence for intensions is satisfied, and that there is an intension 
that bijects Mt onto Md. This will be done now. 
First, G is an intension that maps Mt onto Md; but we can show that it is not 
one-one. Define New(z) ~ (Vz '< z)(G(z') ~ G(z)). Evidently, there is no last z such 
that New(z) (otherwise we could define a bounded intension b such that 
b(O),..., b(c) would enumerate in ~----and therefore in ~ the whole of Md); this 
contradicts axiom (6) of infinity. Thus, there is a p.i.b.d, increasing enumeration K 
of all c such that New(c) by all c ~ Mt. Now, let H(z)= G(K(z)); then H is a 
bijection of Mt onto Md and, being p.i.b.d, in ~,  it is an element of/~ri. Here we 
use Lemma (8). 
Finally, observe that if we change the axioms of Definition 5.2 by weakening (4) 
to 
(Vz)(3!x)A(z, x, . . .)~ (3y)(Vz)A(z, y(z), . . .) 
but add our bijection axiom (3y) (y bijects time elements onto data elements), then 
we can prove the origina ! (4). 
Assume (Vz)(3x)B(z, x , . . . )  and let G be an intension that bijects time onto data. 
Define 
xl < (3zD( G(zl) = & (Vz2< z )G(z2) x2); 
evidently, each nonempty p.i.b.d, subset of Ma has a <-least element. 
Define A(z, x,. . .)  ~ x is the <-least Xo such that B(z, Xo,...); then A(z, x, . . . )  
B(z, x, . . . )  and (Vz)(3!x)A(z, x, . . . ) ,  thus there is a y such that (Vz)A(z, y(z), . . . ) ;  
hence (Vz)B(z, y(z), . . .) .  This completes the proof of Theorem 5.5. [] 
Theorem 5.6. I f  a pure dynamic formula A is satisfiable in TD ~3 TT, then it is 
satisfiable in TD ~ TT. 
Proof. By Lemma 5.3, A is equivalent o an i-bounded formula A'; since A is 
satisfiable in TD 0)3 TT, A' is also satisfiable and, by Theorem 5.5, there is a model 
~3 ~ TD ~3 TT in which A' (and hence A) is satisfiable and such that ~3 has an 
intension G which bijects Mt onto Md. Using G, make ~Er~ t to a model ~ of TD~TT 
simply by transferring the structure Mo onto Mt. It is clear that ~ is a model of 
TD0)TT, i.e., that it satisfies induction w.r.t. (TD~TT)-formulas since ~R3 satisfies 
induction w.r.t, i-bounded formulas and (TD0)TT)'formulas of ~ translate to 
i-bounded formulas of ~IR3. Now one proves analogously to Theorem 5.4 the 
following lemmas. 
Simple dynamic logic 257 
"rn3" ¢~ s~) and (Sl) a = (S2) a for  Lemma 5.4.4'. For each program a, p~(s~, s2) iff a~, tSl ,  
all nonstandard a ~ M. 
Lemma 5.4.5'. For each p.d.f. A and each s ~ ST(~), ~~ ~ A[s] iff ~.R3 ~ A[ s~]. 
Now let ~3 ~ A[k]; let all variables of A be among x0 , . . . ,  xn. Obviously, we 
can assume that, for all i>~ n, k ( i )=  G(0); but then, k=s  # for an appropriate 
s e ST(~). Thus, by Lemma 5.4.5', ~ ~ A[s].  This completes the proof of Theorem 
5.6. [] 
Remarks 5.7. (1) In [6] it is shown among other things that Theorems 5.4 and 5.6 
remain valid if the definition of TD~)TT is changed as follows: 
(i) Induction is assumed for all formulas. 
(ii) Existence of intensions given by i-bounded formulas is replaced by the 
following scheme for each formula A: 
(Vz ) (3x)A(z ,x , . . . )  
--> (Vx  )(V z)( 3y  )[ (Vz '  < z ) a ( z', (y( z'), . . .) )(Vz'  >~ z )(y( z') = x)]. 
The modified system is used in various recent papers of the ANS group (see, e.g., 
[15]). 
(2) The interested reader should consult [5] where a three-sorted axiomatic system 
for the ANS dynamic logic is elaborated. The system described there is more general 
than the present hree-sorted system since it does not make any a priori assumptions 
about time. 
Appendix A. Some basic facts on PA and its models 
Peano arithmetic PA is a first-order theory with the equality predicate =, one 
unary function symbol S (successor), two binary function symbols +, • (addition, 
multiplication) and a constant 0 (zero). For each natural number n we have the 
nth numeral 
s .  . . s (o ) .  
(n times) 
The following are axioms of PA: 
O # Sx, Sx = Sy -'> x = y, 
x+0=x,  x. 0=0,  
x+Sy=S(x+y) ,  x .  Sy=x 'y+x.  
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For each formula A in which x is free (and which possibly contains other free 
variables) we have the following induction axiom: 
(A(0) & (Vx)(A(x)-> A(Sx)))--> (Vx)A(x) .  
In PA, one defines <~ as follows: x <~y=--(3z)(z+x = y). One can define primes, 
divisibility, exponentiation, etc.; it is very important hat one can define (code) 
sequences, i.e., a predicate seq(x) (x is a sequence), the function lh(x) (length of 
a sequence) and an operation (x)y (the yth member of x). One proves that if 
y > lh(x), then (x)y = 0. A model of PA is a structure interpreting the language of 
PA so that all the axioms of PA are true. The standard model 92 is the set of all 
natural numbers with the usual operations; there are many nonstandard models. 92 
is an initial segment of each model of PA (up to an isomorphism). In each model 
of PA,. elements of 92 are standard numbers, elements of M-  N (if any) are 
nonstandard numbers. 
If a e M and M ~ seq(a), then a is an ~D2-finite sequence. If the length of a is a 
nonstandard number, then 'from outside' a is (codes) a particular infinite sequence 
indexed by elements of M less than lh(a). 
A set X c_ M of elements of M is definable in ~ if there is a formula A(x, y) of 
PA and an element b ~ M such that X is the set of all a ~ M satisfying A(a, b) in 
~[R. (This is the notion of parametrical definability.) Similarly for a relation y c_ 
M x M. The following lemma is important for our considerations: 
I.emma A.I. For each Y c M × M definable in a model ~ of PA there is a least 
Z ~_ Y, Z c M x M, Z definable in ~ and reflexive and transitive. 
Indeed, if (a~, a2)e Y-~f f~ A(al ,  a2, b), then 
(a l ,  a2) E Z ---- 
~IR ~ a~ = a2 v (3e)(seq(e) & (Vi < lh (e ) -  1)A((e),, (e),+~, b) 
& (e)o = al & (e)lh(e)-I  = a2). 
Caution: If Y' is the reflexive transitive closure of Y, then Z D_ y '  but we can 
have Z # Y': for example, if Y= {(al, a2)[~3~  a2 = Sal}, then (0H, a) e Z for each 
a but (0H, a)~ Y' iff a is standard. 
For more information on PA see [4, 8, 12, 17, 18, 19]. 
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